In Plato’s dialogues, the notion of παράδειγμα not only encompasses a broad semantic
range but also refers to poles in radical tension. On the one hand, it denotes
ontologically and axiologically excellent objects; on the other, simple examples and
deliberately insignificant activities. A combined analysis of these two meanings
will reveal the twofold nature of παράδειγμα and, most importantly, will highlight
significant aspects of continuity between them – without eliminating the underlying
tension, but rather emphasising its value.

Plato, Model, Example, Dialectic, Knowledge, Paradeigmatism

This paper examines Hume’s aesthetics by focusing on his essay Of the Standard of Taste and adopting a line that favors moderate scepticism as the primary interpretive
tool, not the attribution of value judgments to the realm of sentiments. This choice appears justified not only by reasons internal to the essay, but also by the analogies between Hume’s reflections on taste and those set forth in his earlier work The Sceptic. Thus, after comparing the arguments and counterarguments Hume forces upon his readers, and acknowledging the importance of experience, it is the role played by scepticism that seems more crucial than the role of sentiment in concluding that the difficulty of arriving at a rule of taste is ultimately surmountable.

Hume, Aesthetics, Standard of Taste, Scepticism, Sentiment

In twentieth-century Italy, the image of Hegel was heavily influenced by Neo-Idealism. Reacting to the violence of the Fascism and the World War, Massolo committed himself to bring the value of man and the destinies of the world to the center of the philosophical landscape. He thus targeted Hegelian philosophy, identifying in it the heart of the problem: the source from which Croce and Gentile’s thought had drawn nourishment. However, in the post-war period, Massolo became convinced that the philosophical mortification of man and the world did not originate from Hegel’s own thought, but from the lens through which Neo-Idealism had induced to read him. In his future investigations, he therefore dedicated himself to refuting this interpretation, presenting us with an original and unprecedented Hegel: a philosopher of freedom, human value, and historical concreteness.

Individual, Historical World, Ideology, Common Sense, Inwardness

Populism; Democracy; Consent; Freedom of Speech

Jürgen Habermas is widely regarded as one of the foremost European philosophers of the twentieth century and the leading representative of the second generation of the Frankfurt School. The essay traces his intellectual development, academic career, and major works. At the core of his philosophy lies a profound confidence in communicative reason, dialogue, and democracy as means of emancipation and political legitimacy. Habermas was a defender of Enlightenment modernity and of the emancipatory power of rational dialogue, so that one might consider him a undamental point of reference for resisting authoritarian tendencies and the decline of democracy.

Jürgen Habermas, Frankfurt School, Communicative action, Theory of Discourse, Constitutionalism, Democracy

Karl Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas, though they belonged to different generations, shared a philosophical commitment forged by the experience of National Socialism:
to reconsider the conditions of democratic coexistence through guilt, responsibility, and truth. This article argues that Jaspers remains a constant, evolving interlocutor throughout Habermas’s work, not as its point of departure but as the partner in a recurring, largely implicit dialogue. Four moments structure this engagement: Habermas’s early critique of Jaspers’s philosophy of existence; their convergence on historical responsibility in the debate on Nazi crimes; Jaspers’s bearing on the relation between reason and religion in a post-secular age; and the reappraisal of the Axial Age within Habermas’s genealogy of post-metaphysical thought.

Karl Jaspers, Jürgen Habermas, Historical Responsibility, Postmetaphysical Thought, Axial Age

The essay reconstructs the fundamental elements of Habermas’s discourse theory, with particular attention to the relationship between popular sovereignty and in- dividual rights. Against the backdrop of his normative theory based on the Dis- course Principle, the author argues that democracy operates on two levels: the in- stitutional level (Parliament and government) and the level of civil society, where public debate takes shape. From this perspective, Habermas acknowledges the risks posed by the manipulation of the media and social networks, which can undermine the quality of democratic deliberation. While his theory offers an innovative mod- el, it leaves unresolved the problems concerning the relationship between citizens, institutions, and economic powers in contemporary democracies.

Jürgen Habermas, Democracy, Frankfurt School, Sovereignty, Rights