In this essay the Author defines the place of Gian Vincenzo Gravina in modern science and analyzes his critical and impartial position between the ancient and modern world. Just thanks to his independent thought, the Calabrian philosopher manages to conceive a modern political and juridical science aiming at the pursuit of common good. However, the path that leads to the foundation of a State based on progress and balance among social classes is estremely hard and requires an appropriate educational process, to affirm which the contribution by the figure of the thinker is fundamental, whose main feature is distant both from the sovereign and from illiterate people.

Gravina, Poetry, Law, Community, Politics

The core hypothesis of this inquiry consists of the following thesis: Schellingian legal thought constitutes a kind of legal anarchism which represents a specific form of theocratic eschatology. If it is correct to assert that, on the one hand, Schelling constantly elaborates and reformulates an ontology adept at the foundation of the Rechtslehre, it is equally true that, on the other hand, it is legal anarchism which orients the speculative direction of ontology itself. Thus, legal anarchism as politics of ontology is eminenter that particular configuration of intersubjective relationships, and, specifically, of those between the individual and the legal order of State, which represents itself as a precise theocratic self-foundation, namely a sort of anarchist and mystical society which lives inside the political reality, but, at the same time, considers itself as beyond the State and its law.

Schelling, Legal Anarchism, Theocracy, Eschatology, Politics of Ontology

In discussing the problem of the crisis of philosophical historiography, the paper brings the current prevalence of the “presentist” attitude back to the oblivion of labour process that Marx considers to be the origin of the commodity fetishism. As regards the so-called “Italian theoretical Marxism”, the paper shows how one outcome of “presentism” is the revisionist exegesis which, on questionable textual grounds, calls the Marxism of Gramsci (and of Antonio Labriola himself) into question in order to separate him from the experience of the Bolshevik revolution.

Presentism, Post-modernism, Antonio Gramsci, Antonio Labriola, Commodity Fetishism

This essay shows how Finley’s historical reconstruction of ancient, or, better, Athenian views of slavery depends heavily on contemporary American theories in the realm of common law. This is in clear contrast to his constant teaching that modern conceptualizations must not be applied in any reconstruction of the ancient world’s social relations. The essay therefore tries to explain some difficulties in Finley’s writings.

Slavery, Moses Finley, Economy in Ancient Greece, Aristotle, Common Law

This paper aims at that phenomenological revision known as the “New Phenomenology” introduced in the philosophical landscape by the German philosopher Hermann Schmitz. According to this new philosophical paradigm, emotions and feelings are “atmospheres” poured out spatially that move the felt body. Countering the psychologist, reductionist, and introjectionist objectification of feelings and emotions, the “New Phenomenology” assumes that the idea of the soul, meant as a private inner sphere containing its entire experience, is mistaken. This paper, then, attempts to investigate the extent to which phenomenological revision serves to “approximate” the spontaneous life experience, that is, what really happens to people in a felt matter without them having intentionally constructed it.  

New Phenomenology, Atmosphere, Felt Body, Surfaceless Space, Quasi-Things

A central theme in Western philosophical thought extending back to Greek and Roman antiquity is the ideal of human exceptionalism. Exponents of this ideal have proclaimed the categorical superiority of human beings over all non-human beings in the created world, on the grounds that human beings are unique in possessing the capacity for logos. Almost without exception, these thinkers have conceived of logos in narrowly anthropocentric terms, namely, in terms of the predicative rationality and linguistic capacity that appear to be unique to human beings. Martin Heidegger noted a fundamental distinction between two different levels of meaning that sheds light on the anthropocentric limitations of the traditional ideal of human superiority. That distinction is one between “apophantic” and “hermeneutical” discourse. This distinction helps to shed light on the fact that many nonhuman animals, and not just human beings, participate actively in the articulation of meaning, thereby further shedding light on the fact that the tradition’s narrowly anthropocentric conception of logos is motivated by human arrogance rather than by a sober interest in the truth. 

Anthropocentrism, Animal Rights, Morality, Agency, Human Exceptionalism

The essay explores the complex interplay between war and human rights, highlighting the debate on the ethics of military intervention in the internal affairs of a state. The central question is whether it is ethically and legally permissible to intervene to stop gross violations of human rights. The author starts from three basic statements: There are universal ethical principles; The principle of non-intervention can be limited by these principles; It is morally permissible or necessary to intervene with force to stop human rights violations. The author argues that although the first two statements can be accepted, the third is problematic and could even negate universal ethical principles. 

War, Human Rights, Humanitarian Interventions, Principle of NonIntervention, Moral Principles

This essay draws a biographical sketch of one the most influential legal philosophers in the Spanish-speaking world, Ernesto Garzón Valdés. It analyses his intellectual affiliation and stages, offers a reflective summary of his main contributions to legal philosophy, and finally a brief introductory note on his fundamental Guerra y derechos humanos. In this essay Garzón Valdés focuses on Kantian autonomy and the conceptual framework he designed to address paternalism to argue that while non-armed interventions are potentially justifiable, armed interventions are unjustifiable. This conclusion is not based on sovereignty issues but on the fact that such interventions inevitably violate the rights of innocent individuals.  

Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Human Rights, Argentin Legal Philosophy, Kantian Autonomy, Concept of Law