Rappresentazione e oggetto nella gnoseologia stoica*

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One of the features of Stoic epistemology that is most attractive to contemporary theorists is the ontological constraint on which it is based. According to the Stoics, an inquiry on the appropriateness of our beliefs and their relation with the world must proceed through an inquiry on the kind of object that they represent, i.e. through the individuation of the ontological category under which their object can be subsumed. The first part of this paper is devoted to an analysis of Zeno's definition of cognitive representation. My claim will be that the originator of the Stoic tradition conceived of the represented object as a well-defined entity, possessing specific ontological properties. I also offer a criticism of David Sedley's interpretation of the aforementioned definition. In the second part, I will contend that both the introduction of the genus pos echon *in the Stoic theory of categories, and the use of the verb* huparcho *in the Stoic definition of true and false proposition, which are probably due to Chrysippus, can be interpreted as a way of strengthening the link between ontology and epistemology that Zeno introduced.*

Uno dei tratti della gnoseologia stoica che maggiormente attrae lo studioso moderno è, probabilmente, il vincolo ontologico che la istituisce. Agli occhi degli Stoici, cioè, interrogarsi sulla legittimità delle nostre credenze e del loro rapporto con il mondo equivale, anzitutto, a chiedersi quale tipo di oggetto esse rappresentino, ovvero a quale categoria ontolo-