This paper aims to discuss Wittgenstein’s account of belief. Wittgenstein wrote a considerable amount of remarks concerning this topic. Most of them deal with the discussion of Moore’s paradox. In this paper, I will confine myself to only some of these remarks and I will not consider the paradox as such. My main purpose is to show that Wittgenstein held a double-faced account of belief. According to some remarks, belief belongs to the category of experiences. These remarks were mostly written in the Forties and are actually related to Moore’s challenging proposition ‘It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining’. On the other hand, according to some remarks noted in the same period but relating to the project of describing a pedigree of the psychological concepts, belief belongs to the category of dispositions and, as such, it bears no resemblance to experiences. My aim is to show that the two accounts are compatible and grasp two different aspects of belief. On the one hand, belief can be seen as the set of behavioural episodes that manifest one’s belief about a certain fact. On the other hand, belief can be regarded as the disposition, in Wittgenstein’s terms the ability, to behave in a certain way when the subject holds a given content as true. Both accounts capture some aspects of the complex mental state that constitutes belief.

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