Oggetti e aspetti intenzionali
nenella teoria dell’astrazione di George Berkeley

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The paper focuses on Berkeley’s Principles and their Introduction and considers his shift from a two-way referential system of knowledge and philosophy of mind to a three-way system, in which a more articulate theory and the epistemic notion of Divine Language play a crucial role for the esse est percipi. Drawing comparison between Berkeley, Locke, Hume, and Saint Augustine, the research considers Berkeley’s skepticism with regards to the existence of abstract and general ideas as the actual base of the Principles, inasmuch as the critical core could still be considered the destruction of the idea of substantia – and therefore, the possibility to “purify” language from a semantical point of view, and to achieve a new theory of knowledge. Also considering the key role of the theory of abstraction for Berkeley and the difficulties that would lead the thinker to later embrace an idealistically conceived metaphysical approach, the paper research argues that his discussion on object of thought in term of “generic objects” is in fact what made him a milestone thinker also for contemporary suggestion about intentionality.

Keywords: Berkeley, Theory of Abstraction, General Ideas, Substantia, Intentionality

1. L’argomento

Parlare di teoria dell’astrazione in un filosofo che fa della critica alle ‘idee generali astratte’ uno dei punti saldi del proprio pensiero potrebbe apparire una contraddizione in termini. Eppure è stata proprio la forza con cui Berkeley ha argomentato contro l’esistenza degli ‘oggetti generici’ a farne un continuo punto di riferimento nella storia del pensiero occidentale, mo-